2026-09-04 · record inc_0006 · updated 2026-10-19
Pragma and Vesu: a wrong USDT conversion triggered 47 liquidations
A stale conversion route and a two-source median made major prices look halved for minutes on Starknet; Vesu liquidated 47 positions.
PragmaVesuStarknetComponent: Pragma publisher software, USDT/USD aggregate; Vesu liquidations
- Event
- Official statement
- Root cause
- Official statement
- Loss
- Official statement
Current status
Assets recovered; curator refunds pending.
Timeline
- 2026-09-04 04:07:52 UTCUSDT/USD aggregate becomes incorrect.
- 2026-09-04 04:08:16 UTC47 liquidations begin; window ends about 04:10.
- 2026-09-04 07:59 UTCSDK 2.13.1 hotfix.
- 2026-09-13Vesu announces completion of asset recovery.
- 2026-09-22Oracle administration moved to a 3-of-5 multisig.
Root cause
Per Pragma, a registry mapped USDC to bridged USDC.e, producing a bad USDT price; freshness filtering left two sources; the publisher then reused that price to convert other feeds.
Basis: official post-mortem · verified by us against that source
Classes: Oracle and spot-price manipulation, Liquidation and collateral logic
Impact: loss and recovery
47 liquidations across 42 borrower wallets in seven pools.
Reported loss
$1.4M
USD basis: Pragma reconstruction: borrower equity lost plus pool bad debt. Collateral seized was $3.08M, a different measure.
Recovered or returned
$1.33M (partial)
Vesu reports 95% recovery at 11 September prices; curator refunds in progress.
Loss and recovery are separate figures. They are never netted, and amounts in different currencies are never added together.
Addresses and transactions
No addresses or transaction hashes have been verified for this record. We do not publish unverified hashes.
Public reproduction file
No public reproduction file is recorded for this incident.
Remediation and defensive indicators
- SDK hotfix, measured USDT conversion, four-source default for USDT and USDC, 3-of-5 multisig. (reported)
Defensive lessons from the class
- Estimate what it costs to move each price and compare it with what that price controls.
- Require a minimum number of genuinely independent sources and reject answers below it.
- Limit exposure to thin collateral.
- Add circuit breakers on abnormal moves.
Sources
Official post-mortem
Pragma: The 4 September oracle incident, post-mortem and updates
Published 2026-09-14 · retrieved 2026-10-19 · Updated through 23 September. Summarises Vesu's own recovery update.
- Nostra Finance: manipulated NSTR price used as collateralShared class: Oracle and spot-price manipulation, Liquidation and collateral logic
Read the full written analysis
Method, uncertainty and corrections
Still unknown
- Final user loss after refunds
- Rollout verification across publishers
Where sources disagree
- Recovery rate uses different prices from Pragma's loss estimates.
Written by ThreatWire editorial. Facts attributed to the sources listed; figures are estimates and not independently verified unless marked on-chain. Published 2026-10-19, last updated 2026-10-19. Figures are estimates from public post-mortems and named analysts; not independently verified unless marked as confirmed on-chain.
No corrections recorded since publication.